Tirare missili non produce grandi effetti dal punto di vista diplomatico. E’ questa, in sostanza, la conclusione tratta da chi si è studiato il dossier sugli sanguinosi attentati alle ambasciate americane in Africa, nel 1998, e la successiva risposta statunitese, con gli attacchi missilistici su Afghanistan e Sudan. Questa la sintesi di un lungo rapporto del 1999, uscito dal dipartimento dell’energia statunitense, appena declassificato e riprodotto da “The National Security Archive”:
. The “war” against terrorism will never be “won,” as terrorism will always be a global problem.
. The August 7, 1998, embassy bombings should not be taken as an indication that U.S. counterterrorism efforts are entirely ineffective.
. The August 20, 1998, retaliatory cruise missile strikes did little to help solve the problem posed by bin Laden and may ultimately prove to have done more harm than good.
. The risk of future attacks by Osama bin Laden or his associates using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) is not insignificant.
. The root cause of the militant threat is the widespread and deep-seated discontent among a large segment of the Islamic world, as opposed to the actions or agitation of any one individual or group of individuals. As such, diplomatic options are likely to be the most effective strategies at reducing the threat.
Meno di due anni dopo, ci sarebbe stato l’11 settembre.