Così lo ha chiamato Nathan Brown, professore alla Georgetown University ed esperto del Carnegie Endowment for Peace, nel suo ultimo intervento per il think tank statunitense. Fallito tutto ciò che è stato fatto sinora per risolvere il conflitto israelo-palestinese, è tempo di passare al piano B. Una versione più ridotta dello scritto di Brown è su Foreign Policy. Ecco le conclusioni
Rather than chasing an elusive peace, George Mitchell, the U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, should focus on stretching a short-term cease-fire into a medium-term armistice — a modus vivendi in which Israelis and Palestinians live without hurting each other for five to 10 years. An armistice will have to codify a situation that both sides find tolerable for a while. Hamas could operate freely and govern; Israel could live free from rocket fire and other attacks on civilians. Neither side could be allowed to use the period to impose permanent changes: Israel would have to accept a real settlement freeze, and Hamas would have to live with an internationally patrolled arms embargo.
Of course, such a U.S. shift would immediately provoke severe criticisms that it violates the long-standing taboo on negotiating with a terrorist organization. Like many taboos, this one obscures thinking more than it clarifies.
First, the original rationale for refusing to negotiate with Hamas is that doing so would encourage terrorism. Yet it was only after Hamas fired rockets on Israeli towns, after all, that Israel sought to negotiate a cease-fire. Perversely, when Hamas wishes to practice regular diplomacy rather than blackmail against civilians, it is treated fully as a pariah.
But more importantly, the argument against “engaging Hamas” completely misses the point. The important question is not whether the United States enters into formal discussions with the Islamist group, but what the United States says and does when other countries attempt to speak with Hamas. On this point, even the Bush administration itself quietly shifted last year when it endorsed Egyptian mediation between Fatah and Hamas.
An armistice is the most that can be hoped for now, but it will not work forever. It should therefore lead peacemakers to focus on two long-term tasks.
The first task is encouraging an effort to rebuild a Palestinian political system capable of making decisions. That means tolerating reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah — as long as it leads in the long run to elections and rotation in power rather than permanent power-sharing and paralysis.
The second order of business is confronting each side with the need to make hard choices. Faced with options, both Israelis and Palestinians have a habit of selecting “all of the above.” Israel has raced to build settlements while talking of a two-state solution; Hamas has pursued diplomacy and governing while also continuing its bloody version of “resistance.” Over the short term, it often makes sense for politicians to preserve options. But over the long run, the result has been fatal to any diplomatic process.
The only alternative offered at present is to negotiate a two-state solution now as if there were a viable Palestinian leadership, no Hamas, no Palestinian civil war, and no ongoing settlement activity. And we’ve seen how that has turned out.